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This research examines inferences about the emotional states of ingroup and outgroup victims 
after a natural disaster, and whether these inferences predict intergroup helping. Two weeks 
after Hurricane Katrina struck the southern United States, White and non-White participants 
were asked to infer the emotional states of an individualized Black or White victim, and were 
asked to report their intentions to help such victims. Overall, participants believed that an 
outgroup victim experienced fewer secondary, ‘uniquely human’ emotions (e.g. anguish, 
mourning, remorse) than an ingroup victim. The extent to which participants did infer 
secondary emotions about outgroup victims, however, predicted their helping intentions; in 
other words, those participants who did not dehumanize outgroup victims were the individuals 
most likely to report intentions to volunteer for hurricane relief efforts. This investigation 
extends prior research by: (1) demonstrating infraglobalhumanization of individualized 
outgroup members (as opposed to aggregated outgroups); (2) examining infrahumanization 
via inferred emotional states (as opposed to attributions of emotions as stereotypic traits); and 
(3) identifying a relationship between infra-humanization of outgroup members and reduced 
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Perhaps the most shocking development 
in the aftermath of the Hurricane Katrina 
disaster was the sluggish and inadequate response 
to victims who were clearly in dire need of 
assistance. Even after extensive mainstream 
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news coverage of the miserable conditions at 
the Convention Center and Superdome in 
New Orleans, days passed before water, food, 
and medical supplies were delivered and 
before victims were fi nally evacuated. Michael 
Brown, the Director of the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, famously joked in emails 
about how his clothing looked on television 
as he failed to respond to emails which—with 
increasingly frantic tones—described the 
unfolding crisis (Associated Press, 2005). Why 
was Brown’s response, and the response of 
others responsible for handling the crisis, so 
muted and delayed? Was there something about 
those responsible for helping that impeded the 
helping response? Was there something about 
those who needed help that failed to motivate 
those responsible to engage? We suggest that 
it was a combination of the two: the particular 
mix of those responsible for helping and those 
in need of help obstructed the realization of an 
adequate helping response.
Specifi cally, this research examines how dif-
ferences in observers’ beliefs about the emotional 
anguish of victims may have contributed to the 
inadequate response following Hurricane Katrina, 
whose victims disproportionately were Black, 
Latino, and poor (Branch, 2005; Gelineau, 2005; 
The Washington Post, 2005). After encountering 
tremendous stress and loss, many of the 
victims were likely experiencing complex and 
intense emotions such as grief, mourning, and 
dismay. We propose that the modal consumer of 
news coverage of Katrina—middle-class White 
Americans—failed to perceive Katrina victims as 
experiencing those emotions, and that this denial 
enervated the overall helping response. 
People are more likely to help an ingroup 
member than an outgroup member (Hornstein, 
1978; Levine, Prosser, Evans, & Reicher, 2005; 
Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 
1987). The present research aims to shed light 
on why people display an intergroup helping 
bias, by examining how people’s inferences 
about the emotional states of victims may 
both trigger and impede helping responses to 
outgroups. We emphasize the role of intergroup 
bias in this process, predicting that: (a) people 
will perceive outgroup victims as experiencing 
less emotional anguish than ingroup victims 
(both Whites observing Black victims, and non-
Whites observing White victims); and (b) these 
differences will predict willingness to come to 
the aid of members of outgroups. 
Ascribing emotions to ingroups vs. 
outgroups
How are emotions ascribed to ingroups and out-
groups? A recent social psychological account 
comes from the social identity perspective, uniting 
the concepts of ingroup favoritism (Brewer & 
Brown, 1998) and subjective essentialism 
(Corneille & Leyens, 1994; Rothbart & Taylor, 
1992). Leyens and colleagues (2000, 2001, 
2003; Demoulin et al., 2004) describe how 
people are motivated to reserve the ‘uniquely 
human’ essence for ingroups and to withhold 
it from outgroups. This phenomenon—
‘infrahumanization’—involves ascribing 
greater intelligence (Crocker, Major, & Steele, 
1998) and language competency (Giles & 
Coupland, 1991) to ingroups, while denying 
outgroups those same competencies (Harris & 
Fiske, in press). 
Infrahumanization also involves attribut-
ing to outgroups less capacity for feeling a full 
range of emotions (see Leyens et al., 2003 for a 
review). This theoretical approach differentiates 
primary emotions, such as pleasure, fear, and rage, 
from secondary emotions, such as admiration, 
resentment, and disappointment (Demoulin 
et al. 2004). The former are believed to be 
experienced by both human and non-human 
animals; the latter are believed to be experienced 
exclusively by humans. Perceivers associate 
primary emotions, which do not impart a human 
essence, equally with ingroups and outgroups. 
However, perceivers consistently associate more 
uniquely human (i.e. secondary) emotions with 
ingroups than with outgroups, a fi nding that is 
robust across varied intergroup contexts: French-
speaking (i.e. Walloonian) and Dutch-speaking 
(i.e. Flemish) Belgians (Paladino et al., 2002), 
Italians and North Africans (Vaes, Paladino, 
Castelli, Leyens, & Giovanazzi, 2003), and White 
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Americans and Native Americans (Castano & 
Giner-Sorolla, 2006), among others. It should 
also be noted that, intergroup social status 
differences do not moderate the ascription of 
more secondary emotions to ingroups than to 
outgroups; high status groups infrahumanize 
low status groups, and vice versa. 
Inferring emotional states of 
individualized outgroup members
Thus far, researchers have not demonstrated 
infra-humanization of individualized outgroup 
members (Cortes et al., 2002 as cited in Leyens 
et al., 2003). That is, when an outgroup member 
is individualized, or personalized, by a fi rst and 
last name, infrahumanization seems to vanish. 
Leyens and colleagues interpret these fi ndings 
as evidence that infrahumanization is an inter-
group, not an interpersonal, phenomenon 
(Leyens et al., 2003).1 However, in most of these 
studies, participants were asked to ascribe emotions 
as traits of groups by indicating whether a list 
of emotions characterize a given group (e.g. 
Leyens et al., 2001; Paladino et al., 2002; Vaes 
et al., 2003). In other words, participants were 
not asked to infer the emotional states of a group 
member in response to a given situation—how 
that person might be feeling—but whether or 
not the emotions are stereotypic traits of the group 
or group member. 
The present research examines how perceivers 
infer emotions as states of individualized group 
members. People use different strategies for 
inferring mental states (such as emotions) 
of members of ingroups versus outgroups. 
Projection—using the self as a prototype to 
infer another’s mental state—is used to infer 
the mental states of similar others and ingroup 
members, while stereotyping—using generalized 
beliefs about a social group to infer another’s 
mental state—is used to infer the mental states of 
dissimilar others and outgroup members (Ames, 
2004a, 2004b). Because most individuals ex-
perience both primary and secondary emotions 
themselves, they should project both kinds of 
emotions onto members of ingroups when 
inferring emotions; because people stereotype 
outgroups as experiencing fewer uniquely human 
emotions than ingroups, they should be less likely 
to infer secondary emotions about members 
of an outgroup. We hypothesize that when 
participants are asked to infer the emotional 
state of a Hurricane Katrina victim, they will infer 
fewer secondary emotions when that victim is 
an outgroup member than when that victim is 
an ingroup member, but their inferences of 
primary emotions will not differ. 
Emotion inferences and intergroup 
helping
How might these differences in inferred emo-
tional states relate to intergroup behavior, in 
this case helping responses to Katrina victims? 
We propose that humanization (i.e. inferences 
of higher secondary emotions) of individual 
outgroup victims promotes intergroup helping 
by personalizing and increasing the perceived 
similarity to the outgroup member. First, people 
are more generous toward personalized victims 
than they are toward aggregated victims (Small 
& Loewenstein, 2003). For example, using 
personalizing (i.e. humanizing) information 
to single out an individual child with cancer, 
rather than referring to a group of children 
with cancer, greatly increases donations to 
cancer funds (Kogut & Ritov, 2005a, 2005b). 
Second, and more pertinent to the present 
research, both empathizing with an outgroup 
(Batson, Chang, Orr, & Rowland, 2002; Batson 
et al., 1997) and actively considering an outgroup 
member’s point of view (i.e. perspective-taking; 
Galinsky & Ku, 2004; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 
2000; Vescio, Sechrist, & Paolucci, 2003) can 
ameliorate intergroup relations and facilitate 
intergroup helping. Empathy is elicited, in part, 
by viewing the other as similar to the self or the 
ingroup (Batson, Turk, Shaw, & Klein, 1995; 
but also see Batson, Lishner, Cook, & Sawyer, 
2005). Experiencing empathy can also increase 
the perceived similarity to the target, which 
has been shown to mediate the link between 
empathy and helping (Sturmer, Snyder, Kropp, & 
Siem, 2006). From an evolutionary perspective, 
empathy renders the other’s needs self-relevant 
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(Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, & Neuberg, 1997) 
and sensitizes perceivers to exactly what those 
needs are (Sibicky, Schroeder, & Dovidio, 1995), 
thus eliciting helping responses. Similarly, 
by creating an overlap between the self and 
the outgroup (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000), 
perspective-taking increases perceived similarity 
and encourages helping responses to outgroup 
members.
By considering the distinction between infer-
ences of primary versus secondary emotions, 
we hope to theoretically refi ne the relationship 
between empathy and intergroup helping. 
The core idea of infrahumanization is that, 
by attributing fewer secondary (but equal 
primary) emotions to outgroups, perceivers 
deny them the human essence, which they 
reserve for the ingroup. This denial of the 
experience of secondary emotions should 
decrease the perceived similarity, or overlap, 
between the ingroup and the outgroup, thus 
impeding help-giving. On the other hand, 
humanizing an outgroup—via the attribution 
of secondary emotions—should increase the 
perceived similarity between the ingroup and 
the outgroup, thus facilitating help-giving. In 
sum, we hypothesize that inferences of higher 
secondary—but not primary—emotions about 
an outgroup victim will increase the likelihood 
that the perceiver will offer help. 
Why would secondary emotions more strongly 
predict intergroup helping than intragroup 
helping? We suggest that, because inferences 
of secondary emotions are normative when 
observing members of the ingroup (e.g. Leyens 
et al., 2001), they are not diagnostic in predicting 
ingroup-directed behavior. For outgroups, on the 
other hand, inferences of secondary emotions 
are rare, possibly making such inferences highly 
salient—and possibly highly diagnostic—in 
predicting behavior toward outgroups; we ex-
plore this possibility in the study below.
Summary of hypotheses
The present study tested two hypotheses. 
First, we predict that participants will infer 
higher secondary emotions about the states 
of individualized ingroup victims than about 
individualized outgroup victims, but will not 
differentiate ingroup and outgroup victims 
on inferences of primary emotions. Second, 
we predict that participants who infer lower 
secondary emotions will be less likely to report 
intentions to help with Katrina relief efforts. 
However, we predict that this relationship 
between infrahumanization and helping inten-
tions will be stronger in intergroup conditions 
(i.e. non-White participants rating White victim; 
White participants rating Black victim) than in 
intragroup conditions. By examining intergroup 
reactions to victims of an actual disaster shortly 
after it occurred, we are able to examine these 
processes in a real-world context.
Preliminary study: Scale development
We conducted a preliminary study to obtain 
ratings of the primary emotions (confusion, 
pain, distress, fear, panic, anger, rage) and 
secondary emotions (grief, sorrow, mourning, 
anguish, guilt, remorse, resentment) used 
in the main study (below). Though previous 
infrahumanization research has measured both 
negative and positive emotions, we thought it 
unlikely that observers would perceive Katrina 
victims as experiencing positive emotions such 
a short time after the storm. Also, the inclusion 
of positive emotion items might have artifi cially 
decreased the variance in the ratings on the 
more relevant negative emotions. Thus, we chose 
to omit positive emotions and include only 
negative ones. 
Seventy Rutgers University undergraduates 
volunteered to complete the questionnaire, 
rating the 14 emotions on four questions: ‘Is the 
ability to experience this emotion exclusive to 
human beings or can animals also experience 
it?’ (humanity); ‘Does the experience of this 
emotion involve cognitive components, i.e., 
how much thinking is associated with this 
emotion?’ (cognitive complexity); ‘Does the 
fact that people experience this emotion give 
us, in your opinion, any idea about their moral 
nature, about their morality?’ (morality); and 
‘How negative is this emotion?’ (valence), using 
a 5-point scale (1 = not at all, 5 = extremely). The 
humanity, cognitive complexity, and morality 
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items comprised the primary/secondary scale 
(see Demoulin et al., 2004). We measured 
valence to ensure that our two scales did not 
differ signifi cantly on that variable, a potential 
confound. As expected, our primary (M = 1.58) 
and secondary (M = 3.31) emotions items 
differed signifi cantly on the primary/secondary 
scale (t(12) = 8.42, p < .001), but did not differ 
on valence (t(12) = .28, ns).
Method
Participants 
Participants for the main study were recruited at 
a New Brunswick, New Jersey train station during 
morning rush hour approximately two weeks 
after Hurricane Katrina. The experimenters 
approached participants and asked, ‘Would 
you be willing to complete a short survey about 
Hurricane Katrina for $2?’ Participants who 
complied with the request were given a letter-
sized self-addressed stamped envelope, which 
contained the two-page questionnaire and two 
$1 bills. 
The experimenters distributed 238 question-
naires, 116 (49%) of which were completed and 
returned. Of those 116 participants, 51% were 
female; 53% were White, 16% were Black, 19% 
were Asian or Asian-American, 8% were non-
White Latino; the remaining 4% responded 
‘other’ or did not provide race information. 
Given our focus on a particular intergroup 
context, we excluded from the analyses the 25 
participants who did not self-identify as Black, 
White, or Latino, reducing our data analysis 
n to 91 (62 White non-Latino participants, 
29 Black and non-White Latino participants). 
We combined Black and Latino participants 
because these were the two groups who were 
disproportionately harmed by Hurricane Katrina 
(Branch, 2005; Gelineau, 2005; The Washington 
Post, 2005), and because our subsample of 
Black participants was not suffi cient alone for 
the analyses. The same approach has been 
used in other empirical social science research, 
such as the Boston Federal Reserve Mortgage 
Lending Study that identifi ed patterns of race 
discrimination in mortgage lending patterns 
(Munnell, Tootell, Brown, & McEneaney, 1996). 
Materials and procedure
Participants read a fi ctionalized news story about 
a mother who had lost a child during Hurricane 
Katrina. We manipulated race by using names 
more common to Black Americans or White 
Americans (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004; 
Levitt & Dubner, 2005). The victim’s surname, 
Johnson, was held constant across conditions. The 
story began, ‘Two weeks after the storm, Tanesha/
Amanda Johnson has yet to hear word about her 
2-year-old son, Tyrell/Joshua, who was with his 
uncle when Hurricane Katrina hit’. In about 
200 words, the article goes on to describe the 
mother’s efforts to fi nd her lost child. We avoided 
using quotes or descriptions that conveyed 
information about the victim’s emotional state. 
The child’s fate was left unresolved. 
On the next page, participants read, ‘The fol-
lowing questions concern how Tanesha/Amanda 
Johnson might have been feeling at the time this 
story was reported. In your opinion, how much 
was Tanesha/Amanda Johnson feeling each 
of the following emotions?’ Participants rated 
the seven secondary emotions (grief, sorrow, 
mourning, anguish, guilt, remorse, resentment) 
and the seven primary emotions (confusion, 
pain, distress, fear, panic, anger, rage), on a 5-point 
scale (1 = not at all to 5 = extremely).
On the fi nal page, participants were asked 
whether they intended to volunteer their time 
to Hurricane Katrina relief efforts (yes/no), 
and whether they had already volunteered 
(yes/no). 
Results
Inferred emotions
Each emotion item was weighted by its rating 
on the continuous primary/secondary scale, 
which was centered around the median, from 
the preliminary study data. From the weighted 
scores, we created composite measures of primary 
(α = .82) and secondary (α = .80) emotions. 
We submitted the primary and secondary 
emotions scales to a 2 (Victim Race: Black, 
White) × 2 (Participant Race: White, Black/
Latino) multivariate analysis of variance 
(ANOVA). There were no main effects of 
Victim Race or  Participant Race on either of the 
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emotions scales. As expected, the Victim Race × 
Participant Race interaction was not signifi cant 
for the primary emotions scale (F(1, 91) = 1.96, 
ns); participants did not differentiate ingroup 
victims from outgroup victims when inferring 
primary emotions. However, the critical Victim 
Race × Participant Race interaction for the second
ary emotions scale was signifi cant (F(1, 91) = 5.62, 
p = .02). As shown in Figure 1, the interaction 
took on the expected form, suggesting that 
participants made lower secondary emotion 
inferences for outgroup victims than for ingroup 
victims. To be certain that only secondary 
emotions, and not primary emotions, were affected 
by the intergroup context, we conducted a 2 
(Victim Race: Black, White) × 2 (Participant 
Race: White, Black/Latino) analysis of covariance 
(ANCOVA) for each type of emotion, entering 
the other type as a covariate. For secondary 
emotions, when controlling for primary 
emotions, the Victim Race × Participant Race 
interaction remained nearly signifi cant (F(1, 
91) = 3.60, p = .06). For primary emotions, on 
the other hand, when controlling for secondary 
emotions the Victim Race × Participant Race 
interaction was not signifi cant (F(1, 91) = .07), 
ns). Consistent with prior infra-humanization 
research, participants demonstrated an intergroup 
bias in their inferences of secondary, but not 
primary, emotions.
We conducted more focused comparisons, as 
well. As predicted, Black/Latino participants 
inferred lower secondary emotions about the 
White victim (M = 1.37) than about the Black 
victim (M = 1.77) (t(27) = 2.40, p = .02).2 White 
participants’ inferences of secondary emotions 
about Black (M = 1.60) and White (M = 1.67) 
victims differed in the predicted direction, but 
this difference was not signifi cant (t(60) = .58, 
ns). White participants inferred lower secondary 
emotions than Black/Latino participants about 
the Black victim (t(48) = 2.08, p < .05), and slightly 
Figure 1. Inferences of secondary emotions by participant race and victim race (F(1, 91) = 5.62, p = .02).
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higher secondary emotions than Black/Latino 
participants about the White victim, although 
this difference was not signifi cant (t(39) = 1.31, 
p = .20). 
Intentions to help 
We predicted that inferences of higher secondary 
emotions about outgroup victims would relate 
to greater intentions to help Hurricane Katrina 
victims. Given our focus on helping intentions as 
an outcome of infra-humanization, we excluded 
from these analyses the 11 participants who re-
ported that they had already volunteered or were 
currently volunteering for Hurricane Katrina 
relief efforts.3 We conducted binary logistic 
regression analyses on the aggregated data, 
entering intention to volunteer (a dichotomous 
categorical variable) as the dependent variable. 
Inferred secondary and primary emotions were 
entered as covariates. As expected, inferences 
of secondary emotions predicted intentions 
to volunteer time to help Hurricane Katrina 
victims, but inferences of primary emotions did 
not (β = 1.95, Wald = 4.43, p < .05, and β = –.27, 
Wald = .03, ns, respectively).4 
To examine our hypothesis that this effect 
would be moderated by group context, such 
that inferences of secondary emotions would 
predict helping intentions in intergroup, but 
not intragroup, contexts, the theoretically 
pertinent analyses required looking at the 
relationship between inferred emotions and 
helping intentions separately for the intergroup 
and intragroup conditions. For intergroup con-
ditions, as hypothesized, inferences of higher 
secondary emotions predicted intentions to 
volunteer time (β = 3.41, Wald = 7.14, p < .01), 
but inferences of higher primary emotions did 
not (β = –1.98, Wald = .85, ns). For intragroup 
conditions, however, neither inferences of second-
ary nor primary emotions predicted intentions 
to volunteer time (β = –1.11), Wald = .74, ns, and 
β = 3.55, Wald = 2.97, ns, respectively).
Discussion
The present study provides several novel and 
intriguing fi ndings. First, when observing the 
aftermath of a real-life natural disaster, perceivers 
infra-humanized outgroup victims, denying 
them the same complexity of emotions that they 
believed ingroup victims would experience in the 
same situation. Specifi cally, people inferred that 
an individual outgroup victim felt less anguish, 
via the experience of secondary emotions such 
as grief, mourning, remorse, and sorrow, than 
an individual ingroup victim. People did not 
differentiate ingroup and outgroup victims on 
inferences of primary emotions, such as fear and 
sadness, as expected. These fi ndings extend prior 
infra-humanization research by demonstrating 
that infra-humanization is not limited to the 
attribution of emotions as general group traits, 
but also manifests in inferences of others’ emo-
tional states, and that perceivers infra-humanize 
individualized outgroup members, just as they 
infra-humanize aggregated outgroups and de-
personalized outgroup members. 
This research also provides initial evidence that 
the infra-humanization of outgroup victims has 
some bearing on how they are treated. Lower 
inferences of secondary emotions—but not 
primary emotions—about victims related to 
reduced intentions to volunteer for Hurricane 
Katrina relief efforts. This moves beyond a 
simple empathy→helping link, demonstrating 
the importance of distinguishing primary from 
secondary emotions. The results imply that 
empathizing with a victim’s experience of 
primary emotions (e.g. fear) does not lead 
to greater helping, but empathizing with a 
victim’s experience of secondary emotions 
(e.g. mourning) does. It is also important to 
emphasize that group context (i.e. intergroup 
vs. intragroup) moderated this relationship; 
the relationship was signifi cant for intergroup 
conditions, but not for intragroup conditions. In 
other words, inferring lower secondary emotions 
about ingroup victims does not relate to helping 
intentions, but inferring lower secondary 
emotions about outgroup victims does. To our 
knowledge, this is the fi rst demonstration of a 
link between infra-humanization of outgroup 
victims and helping. 
These results are in apparent confl ict with 
previous research suggesting that expressions 
of secondary emotions by an ingroup and 
outgroup member elicit opposite responses from 
the perceiver: people respond positively when 
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ingroup members express secondary emotions, 
but negatively when outgroup members express 
those same emotions (Vaes et al., 2003). However, 
we believe that these two sets of results are not 
incongruous. Specifi cally, there is a critical 
difference between an outgroup expressing a 
secondary emotion and a perceiver inferring a 
secondary emotion about an outgroup member. 
In the Vaes et al. studies, outgroup members 
expressed secondary emotions; in our study, 
perceivers inferred that an outgroup member 
was (or was not) feeling secondary emotions. 
If the expression of secondary emotions by out-
groups is counterstereotypic, perceivers might 
punish deviant outgroup members (Rudman, 
1998; Rudman & Fairchild, 2004). Thus, in 
the case of a natural disaster, the expression of 
secondary emotions by outgroup victims might 
ironically lead to intergroup neglect rather 
than helping. 
Although the predicted Participant Race × 
Victim Race interaction was significant for 
inferences of secondary emotions, Black/
Latino participants clearly infra-humanized 
White victims more than White participants 
infra-humanized Black victims. Our post 
hoc, perhaps cynical, interpretation of this 
result concerns the intensive media focus on 
racism that followed Hurricane Katrina, and 
which seemed to peak during data collection 
for this study. This unusual attention to the 
alleged effects of racism may have temporarily 
sensitized White people to expressions of racism, 
creating a vigilance to avoid such expressions. 
Unfortunately, this kind of sensitivity tends to 
be ephemeral (e.g. Hill & Augoustinos, 2001), 
so we suspect that follow-up studies would reveal 
signifi cant infra-humanization in both directions. 
Moreover, others have shown that racial and 
ethnic minority group members express stronger 
outgroup stereotypes and greater intergroup 
bias than majority group members ( Judd, 
Park, Ryan, Brauer, & Kraus, 1995; Verkuyten, 
2005). Two explanations have been offered 
for this difference. First, it has been attributed 
to differences in social desirability concerns, 
such that White people in the US are more 
concerned about appearing racist than members 
of US racial minority groups (Sommers & 
Norton, 2006). Second, the difference has been 
attributed to a greater focus on color-blindness 
and assimilationist thinking by majority group 
members vs. a greater emphasis on multi-
culturalism by minority group members (e.g. 
Judd et al., 1995; Norton, Sommers, Apfelbaum, 
Pura, & Ariely, in press). 
Some methodological shortcomings should be 
addressed in futures studies. First, while there 
is reason to believe Black and Latino victims 
of Hurricane Katrina would respond similarly 
(and analyses did indeed reveal identical trends 
in the Black and Latino subsamples), pooling 
of Black and Latino participants may have 
somehow distorted the results. Given practical 
limitations (i.e. time constraints and inadequate 
subsample sizes) and evidence that the two racial 
groups were both disproportionately affected 
by Hurricane Katrina (Branch, 2005; Gelineau, 
2005; The Washington Post, 2005), we combined 
these subsamples. Second, real behavioral 
measures are needed to more precisely evaluate 
the relationship between infra-humanization 
and intergroup behavior. Third, our data 
collection method (asking people to return 
completed questionnaires in a self-addressed 
stamped envelope) may have overselected a 
‘helpful’ sample of participants, which could 
have somehow infl uenced our results on the 
helping variables. Our ongoing research on 
this topic addresses these issues. 
Future directions
If infrahumanization of outgroups reduces inter-
group helping, then future research should strive 
to identify the conditions that cause perceivers 
to humanize outgroups, which should promote 
intergroup helping. Emphasizing intergroup 
similarities has proven to be an effective interven-
tion for improving intergroup relations in some 
contexts (e.g. Brown, 1984; Chen & Kenrick, 
2002, Study 1; Dovidio, Gaertner, Isen, & 
Lowrance, 1996; but see also Chen & Kenrick, 
2002, Study 2; Silvia, Graham, & Hawley, 2005). 
Taking that idea a step further, priming an 
inclusive identity (i.e. supplanting ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ 
with just ‘us’) can activate helping responses 
toward people formerly seen as outgroup 
members (Dovidio et al., 1997), even in real 
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emergencies (Levine et al., 2005). Moreover, 
perceived similarity to another person improves 
the likelihood that a perceiver will use projection 
when inferring that person’s mental state (Ames, 
2004a). Thus, evidence suggests that emphasizing 
intergroup similarity could increase the extent 
to which perceivers infer secondary emotions 
from outgroup victims, thereby improving the 
likelihood of intergroup helping. 
The present research suggests that intergroup 
helping is associated with inferences about the 
human emotions of those in need. Further 
investigations should explore the mechanisms 
by which infra-humanization decreases inter-
group helping. We suggest that one category 
of mediators are the emotions that perceivers 
themselves experience as a result of making 
emotion inferences about outgroup victims, or 
the extent to which they ‘catch’ the emotions 
of those individuals via emotional contagion 
(Hatfi eld, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994). People are 
more likely to experience the emotions of others 
with whom they share a common bond, from 
pain (Krebs, 1975) to embarrassment (Miller, 
1987) to dissonance (Norton, Monin, Cooper, & 
Hogg, 2003). What is more, a perceiver who 
empathizes or sympathizes with an outgroup 
member is more likely to offer help (Batson et al., 
1997; Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, in press). Teaching 
people to humanize outgroups has even been 
proposed as an effective tool in healing the 
wounds of past intergroup confl ict and reducing 
the chance of future intergroup confl ict (Staub, 
Pearlman, Gubin, & Hagengimana, 2005). To 
the extent that individuals perceive members 
of outgroups as either similar to themselves, or 
as experiencing secondary emotions, or both, 
the tepid response to tragedies when victims are 
seen as outgroups might be improved.
Notes
1. A notable exception can be found in Castano 
& Giner-Sorolla’s (2006)  infra-humanization 
studies, in which participants were asked 
whether a group has the capacity to feel primary 
and secondary emotions.
2. The pattern of means for Black participants 
alone followed the same pattern as found for 
Black and Latino participants combined, with 
higher inferences of secondary emotions for 
Black victims than for White victims (Black 
participants: Ms = 1.81 and 1.60, Latino 
participants: Ms = 1.70 and 1.10).
3. Infrahumanization analyses (i.e. analyses looking 
at effects of participant race and target race on 
inferences of primary and secondary emotions) 
without the 11 participants who had already 
volunteered for relief efforts (n = 80) did not 
differ from the results with the full sample 
(n = 91). For the 2 (Victim Race: Black, 
White) × 2 (Participant Race: White, Black/
Latino) multivariate ANOVA, the Victim 
Race × Participant Race interaction was not 
signifi cant for the primary emotions scale, 
but was signifi cant for secondary emotions 
(F(1, 80) = 1.13, ns, and F(1, 80) = 6.25, 
p = .01, respectively). For the 2 (Victim Race: 
Black White) × 2 (Participant Race: White, 
Black/Latino) ANCOVAs (one for each type of 
emotion, entering the other type as a covariate), 
inferences of secondary emotions remained 
signifi cant, and inferences of primary emotions 
remained nonsignifi cant (F(1, 80) = 5.41, p = .02, 
and F(1, 80) = .51, ns, respectively).
4. Of the 80 participants who had not already 
volunteered for Katrina relief efforts, 25% of 
the participants in the intragroup conditions 
reported intentions to volunteer and 17% in the 
intergroup conditions reported intentions to 
volunteer. This was not a signifi cant difference 
(χ2(1) = .67, ns).
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